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Abstract 
My paper comprises several considerations on Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytical theory, aiming at underlining its alleged 
Structuralistic frame, and also its concept of the unconscious. By this, I intend to cast a light over his hidden assumptions about 
the human psychic, and eventually to stress his perspective on the philosophical matter of human essence. Whether his 
perspective is or could have been relevant for the contemporary philosophical thinking in this respect or not – this will be my task 
to suggest, given Lacan’s self-confidence, as well as the promotion of Lacan’s work in different areas of humanities, since the 
middle of the last Century till today. 
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Motto: “The utmost demand addressed to each of us is to listen to all that something tells us, and to make it tell us. Remembering this for oneself 
is the specific duty of each of us. Doing this for all and doing it convincingly – this is the mission of philosophy.” (Hans-Georg Gadamer, 1999, 
218) 
1. Does Jacques Lacan listen to the unconscious?  
What I intend here is to tackle some main aspects of Jacques Lacan’s theory on the unconscious, in order to 
establish the relevance of the psychoanalysis founded and propagated by the famous French psychoanalyst to the 
philosophical theme of human essence; more precisely, I’ll try to identify his contribution to the depiction, 
interpretation or the attempt to approximate by a certain theory the specificity of the human psychic and its relation 
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to the world. I consider that the magnitude of Lacanian influence on the Structuralist epoch, for decades in the 
European culture and abroad, accounts for this challenge. Also I intend to quote some statements pointing to the 
personality and the character named Jacques Lacan, as I consider that he embodies one of those cases in which the 
author’s biography casts light on his work. 
Here is an aspect which reveals Lacan’s vision regarding philosophy, stated in a discussion with the philosopher 
Jean Hyppolite, in 1954, during one of the meetings of the famous Lacanian seminar held in Paris; it seems that 
Lacan surprisingly “dismissed” philosophy as discipline in favor of a Freudian in statu nascendi theory that would 
have been able to replace it. In this way – he added – this new revolutionary theory would have “access to 
structuralism” (Cf. Roudinesco, 1995, p. 220). He was talking as if the cultural trend named “structuralism” would 
have been a theoretical instance over all domains of humanities and more, even over history. As it seems now, the 
undisturbed simplifying confidence in the methodological virtues of Structuralist linguistics in all the social-
humanist disciplines was the illusion of an entire epoch. But in this case, Lacan goes even further, assuming that a 
new super-theory, together with his original contribution to it, could be able to replace philosophy at all.  
Simon Clarke, the Structuralist trend analyst, argues that its general view is that the human world is a world of 
objective cultural systems which can be studied with methods belonging to positive sciences. (Clarke, 1981, p. 117). 
My supposition is that Lacan assumed this goal, trying to transform psychoanalysis into such a science, but lacked 
the scientific rigor in his approach. In addition to that, I would say he seems to juggle with concepts and to be so 
“creative” and metaphorical, that he disregards what is commonly called “the property of terms”. Without it, the 
attempt to conceptualization is impaired.  
Thus, given from the very beginning, Lacan’s philosophical aspiration casts a doubt over his research on human 
psychic and especially on the unconscious. 
The narratives and the chronology of a French historian of structuralism, François Dosse, can offer a possible 
explanation for the personalized note in which Jacques Lacan conceived his psychoanalytical theory. The historian 
narrates how Lacan conceived his speech at the Congress in Rome, in 1953. After having been chosen the head of 
the Paris Psychoanalytical Society (SPP) following a collective riot against the former manager Sacha Nacht, in the 
same year he is compelled to hand his resignation in favor of the majority preferences towards Daniel Lagache. 
Afterwards, he declares he is excommunicating himself from SPP and in the same time assumes a new, original 
doctrinal direction: “…We must find an attractive path, a French path toward the unconscious.” (Dosse, 1992, p. 
128).  
“A French path” – that sounds more like a vanity declaration than a methodological way, as long as this way to 
the unconscious neither has, nor needs national instruments or marks. In my view, judging by his further theoretical 
statements, this mysterious unconscious capable of social movements and riots has become more and more… 
Lacanian. Lacan’s originality goes to the extent that some colleagues in his audience ask questions and show their 
uncertainties. For instance, Françoise Dolto questioned his abolition of the intellectual development stages of small 
children. Lacan’s conception seems to me contradictory to his own earlier theory concerning the mirror stage 
(which I’ll mention at the end of my paper). He declares: “the very originality of psychoanalysis lies in the fact that 
it does not center psychological ontogenesis on supposed stages – which have literally no discoverable foundation in 
development observable in biological terms.” (Lacan, 1973, p. 74). 
I will next question the theoretical level of his “philosophy”, by analyzing whether the founding concepts which 
Lacan was promoting in his exposés and writings are rigorously described/defined, and constantly used, or not. 
2. Does Jacques Lacan offer a concept of the unconscious? 
Lacan’s first theoretical innovation which I will refer to is that he compared the structuring of the unconscious to 
the way a language is structured. This is the basis of what has been called the Lacanian philosophy of the signifier. 
However, he seems to juggle with the notions, because in some places he argues that the unconscious “is somehow 
an effect of the language” (see Roudinesco, op. cit., p. 223), but in another he says: “Most of you have some idea of 
what I mean when I say – the unconscious is structured like a language. This statement refers to a field that is much 
more accessible to us today than at the time of Freud. I will illustrate it by something that is materialized, at what is 
certainly a scientific level, by a field that is explored, structured, elaborated by Claude Lévi-Strauss and which he 
has pinpointed in the title of his book, La Pensée Sauvage. (…) Before strictly human relations are established, 
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certain relations have already been determined. They are taken from whatever nature may offer as supports, supports 
that are arranged in themes of opposition. Nature provides – I must use the word – signifiers and these signifiers 
organize human relations in a creative way, providing them with structures and shaping them.” (Lacan, 1973, p. 28). 
 Lacan’s opinion is that before any experience, before any individual deduction, even before the collective 
experiences that may be related only to social needs, there is something which organizes this field, and inscribes its 
initial coordinates in our minds. And the psychoanalyst identifies this “something” with the function which Claude 
Lévi-Strauss shows us to be the truth of the totemic function. 
Now, one can wonder what is the reason for choosing such a parallel between the structure of the unconscious 
and the one of wild thinking, let aside they both imply symbolic thinking, based on symbols and metaphors instead 
of concepts? But aren’t there a lot of other kinds of symbolic thinking – such as the poetical one, the mystical one, 
the religious one etc.? Why is totemism convertible to the realm of psychoanalysis, in order to reveal us the nature 
of the civilized man unconscious? 
It seems that Lacan founded his theory to Lévi-Strauss’ original anthropological vision because he saw it as a 
solid scientific theory. As I already analyzed in my book Ordinea si dezordinea simbolurilor (The Order and the 
Disorder of Symbols) (Matei, 2013, pp. 12-33), one can discover here the tribute paid to the illusion of scientific 
spirit triggered at that time by the structural anthropology.† However, one could expect that the French founder of a 
renowned school of psychoanalytical thinking should have evaluated more rigorously the theoretical basis thereof; it 
is not a scientific attitude to rely on future possible accomplishments of some other colleagues’ inquiries, in other 
fields. Besides, as I believe, the Structuralist inquiries have marked more of a gap, than of a continuous evolution, at 
least in anthropology; there is no considerable continuation in this field of Lévi-Strauss’ original, but  less coherent 
line of thinking. I agree with Robert Deliège in what concerns its lack of applicability. (Deliège, 2001, p. 24).  
By its nature psychoanalysis is a discipline that lacks theoretical continuity, because of its history – a multitude of 
different, sometimes contradictory trends and conceptions rooted in the thinking of a few founders. For instance, in 
spite of Lacan’s slogan “Back to Freud!” (that was popular among his students), from the Freudian view to the 
Lacanian view there is a gap; in other words, we deal with different perspectives on the unconscious, if we were to 
take for granted Lacan’s affiliation to the Structuralist anthropological perspective. As it is known, Freud insisted on 
the unconscious content accumulated in one’s mind since childhood – refulated emotions, memories, sufferings etc. 
Though, Lévi-Strauss declares that the unconscious is as empty of any content as a stomach is indifferent from any 
food passing by it, in fact, it is “always void”, a mere structure. (Lévi-Strauss, 1978, p. 244).  
Inconsistently with his first theoretical option – the Freudian one –, Lacan says, with reference to the Structuralist 
one: “It is this structure, in any case, that assures us that there is, beneath the term unconscious, something definable, 
accessible and that can be objectified. But when I urge psychoanalysts not to ignore this field, which provides them 
with a solid support for their labors, does this mean that I hope to include the concepts historically introduced by 
Freud under the term unconscious? No, I don’t think so. The unconscious, the Freudian concept, is something 
different.” (Lacan, 1973, p. 29). 
So, one can wonder, after all, what is Lacan’s conception of the unconscious and what is its connection with the 
reality, with life, with the individual data of a person? Now, judging by the way in which one of his disciples quoted 
him, we can deduce that this void structure is very convenient, but not scientifically adopted, because it allows 
speculative assumptions: “Even if the memories of family repression were not true, one must invent them.” (Apud 
Winter, 2001, pp. 159-160).  Such a conception just confines reality to some arbitrary explanations. In my opinion, 
that doesn’t have anything to do with a scientific approach, nor with the Structuralist view in semiology or 
anthropology. I shall stress this with a quotation from E. Roudinesco, a former disciple of J. Lacan: “Lévi-Strauss 
and Lacan were to remain good friends, although the first would never sustain the other’s doctrine, confessing 
himself that he doesn’t understand it, while the latter would constantly feed himself with the thinking of the first, 
even when he became to express something totally different.” (Roudinesco, 1995, p. 218). 
 
 
† I have analyzed this illusion of scientific spirit concerning the structuralist anthropological view of Claude Lévi-Strauss, as 
well as his mechanisms of schematizing the unconscious, and of incoherently treating symbol as sign or even as concept, in an 
incoherent manner. I’ll try to offer here only a few conclusions. 
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3. Is Jacques Lacan interested in the knowledge of human psychic? 
I shall further approach the symbolism in the Lacanian theory in an attempt to show the way in which the French 
psychoanalyst oscillates between symbol and sign, oscillation which weakens the applicative relevance of this 
theory on the unconscious. 
As I have extensively showed in my book (Matei, 2013, pp. 42-46), Lacan conveys a double meaning to the 
symbolic: as a structure whose discrete elements function as signifier and as founding law of this structure. In their 
specialized dictionary, Laplanche and Pontalis try to approximate a definition of the symbolic: “The symbolic 
designates the order of structured phenomena like a language which psychoanalysis deal with. This term refers also 
to the fact that the efficiency of the cure is based on the founding character of the word.” (Laplanche & 
Pontalis,1994, p. 396).  
In the mean time, the two authors stress that a rigorous definition would come against Lacan’s spirit, who refused 
to believe in a rigid bonding of a signifier to the signified. 
 The French analyst Alain Vanier explains the way in which Lacan transforms the Saussurean relationship of the 
sign, signifié / signifiant, in which the two terms were circled together, by reversing their relation and converting 
them into a fraction so as to underline the tension between the signifier (S) and the signified (s): “S / s = the 
enounced” (Lacan, 1971, vol II, p. 181). The signifier shall express “what the subject represents for another 
signifier. Indeed, the subject is only represented in the assembly of signifiers – the Other – we cannot say what he 
is.” (Vanier, 2000, p. 58).  
As a consequence, it only appears an endless sequence of signifiers represented as follows S1 / S → S2. (Ibidem, 
p. 59). Laplanche and Pontalis also pinpoint that Lacan does not necessarily see the existence of an inner 
relationship between the symbol and the symbolized aspect (Laplanche & Pontalis, op. cit., p. 398). If that was the 
case, according to the founding principle of the Structuralist linguistics, when there is no necessary, inner, natural 
bond between “S” and “s” we are not dealing with a symbol but rather with a sign. (Saussure, 1998, p. 87). 
Therefore, in the description of the unconscious, Lacan speaks of signs and not of symbols. As a paradoxe, the 
Lacanian unconscious is not expressing itself by chosen symbols – that is, coded signifiers like symptoms, myths, 
actes manques, oneiric images etc. for signified issues like traumas, hidden feelings, forgotten memories etc. 
The French analyst François Roustang subjects the Lacanian work to a severe, albeit lucid criticism: “One step 
further shall be made when the theory will be based not only on the limits but also on impasses, in other words on 
erroneous pathways. The fact that any authentic research will fatally engage in the successive impasses before 
finding the right direction is proven by practical experience; in any case, theory must close the wrong tracks in order 
to find others susceptible to lead to the accomplishment of the pursued goal. Considering these impasses as founding 
equals throwing the entire field to sterility and confining it, if it accepted the limited, in a sort of triumph of failure.”  
(Roustang, 1986, p. 117). 
As far as I’m concerned, ignoring the signified nullifies the therapy; the schematic model does not take into 
account the reality, the empiric, the practice, the compliance to the casuistic, it becomes a pseudo-theoretical 
abstract game, a sort of mental scenario of interpretation – pretending to be an explication – of the unconscious, not 
supported by the empirical material anymore. Therefore, the relevance of this mental model for human nature is null 
and void. As a paradox, the Lacanian line of thinking is, in my opinion, to be disapproved particularly because it 
cannot be applied to the domain of human psyche. That is because of his almost ludic attitude disguised in scientific 
rigor. From a cultural perspective, his approach could be appreciated as very creative, even captivating, but from a 
scientific perspective it can lead only to sterility and, in some cases, even to imposture – because what Lacanian 
theory clearly lacks is exactly the scientific rigor. In spite of this, it seems to be perpetually called out, as in the 
discourse which Lacan held in 1975, at Yale University: “The psychic is a test of rigor. Thus, I would say I am 
psychotic. I am psychotic for the single reason that I have always tried to be rigorous.” (Apud Roustang, op. cit., p. 
107).  
I consider that, in the philosophy emerging from the Lacanian psychoanalytical theory, the main place, which 
embodies its specificity, belongs to his conception on the mirror stage. Although it appeared at the beginning of his 
theoretical work extended throughout decades with exegetic reverberations until today, the mirror stage remains, as I 
believe, the Lacanian contribution that had the most pregnant impact on culture. During the 16th International 
Congress of Psychoanalysis at Zurich, in 1949, Lacan presented a paper (Lacan, 1971, pp. 89-97) on the stage in the 
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infant’s development (between six and eighteen months) in which the infant begins to observe his/her own image in 
the mirror. The psychoanalyst named this the mirror stage and he talked about its formative role as “symbolic 
matrix” for the future function of the ego. (1971, p. 90). The child sees his own reflection in the mirror identifying 
himself / herself and perceiving his body as a whole; it is a form that anticipates a bodily unity of his being, of the 
subject. At the same time, it is the first experience of identification with the “other” (the image in the mirror). Now, 
the subject’s ego reveals its imaginary character in which the relationship with the other prevails; therefore, the ego 
would be constituted, at its very origins, as another, as the Other – hence, his alienated nature, in Lacan’s vision.  
This game between ego and the Other in the mirror represents the Lacanian testimony regarding the otherness 
infiltrated in the very structure of human mind from his earliest life experiences. The extension of this testimony in a 
philosophy of the subject would have conveyed a much higher value to the Lacanian theory. Unfortunately, in my 
opinion, Lacanian philosophy of the signifier isn’t the result of a serious approach of the human mind; Lacan didn’t 
manage to really listen to what the unconscious has to tell us, always in a disguised and symbolic way. His 
perspective only knew a sinuous, contradictory and unstructured course in spite of all claims of Structuralist rigor, 
which confines it to a history of an ephemeral cultural fashion, as I see. 
The French psychoanalyst continued, deliberately or not, this sequence of diminishing the instance of the ego, 
leaving the impression that the subject is in fact an illusory person or – according to two French analysts – “a verbal 
subject given to support the synthesis of the most heteroclite functions” (Millet & Varin d’Ainvelle, 1972, p. 61). It 
is from this perspective that one could consider the Lacanian view on human subject as anti-humanistic. And if this 
is the evaluation of neutral readers, let’s see how some former colleagues and friends see Lacan’s theory.  
The French psychiatrist Henry Ey, the one who used to organize colloquies for the theoretical debates among 
psychiatrists and psychoanalysts (see Dosse, 1992, pp. 124-125) notes: “«The Structuralist analysis» of man, its 
reduction to a chain of words or of things compromises, indeed, the human existence and essence.” (Ey, 1998, p. 
14). The French psychiatrist mentions the Lacanian error in associating unconscious with language in what concerns 
their structure. He argues that the two should not be confused with one another, and that language has only a 
mediating function with reference to the unconscious: “It is not the unconscious that is structured like a language, 
but rather the unconscious in the process of becoming conscious is a language because the Subject speaks it, leaving 
in himself a rest, a capacity that appears only metaphorically in the discourse.” (Ey, op. ct., p. 13). 
In what concerns the human existence, we can perceive again the anti-humanistic view, as long as the French 
Psychoanalist explicitly argues that, from his perspective, the principle of reality will not have the last word, that 
reality is conceived as suffering (souffrance), and life as dreaming (songe). (Lacan, 1973, pp. 65-66). 
Now I consider it shows better that Jacques Lacan’s theoretical view on human psychic is insufficiently 
articulated and consistent to provide a more profound philosophical view on human essence. Given the philosopher 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s opinion on what it means to accomplish the mere mission of philosophy, I would say that 
Lacan failed in listening to the unconscious, and paradoxically wasn’t interested in making it to speak to him.  
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